| 基于博弈模型的绿色物流税收策略 |
| 投稿时间：2009-09-23 修订日期：2009-10-29 点此下载全文 |
| 引用本文：张颖菁,刘娟娟.基于博弈模型的绿色物流税收策略[J].上海海事大学学报,2010,31(1):52-55. |
| 摘要点击次数: 1924 |
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| 基金项目: 国家高技术研究发展计划（“八六三”计划）项目（2007AA04Z105）;浙江省科技厅重大科技专项项目（2008C11106 2）;上海海事大学重点学科建设项目(2009445318) |
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| 中文摘要:为确定对在物流活动中发生污染的企业增收的税收比例，选取制定税收政策的政府部门和接受调控的在物流活动中发生环境污染的企业作为博弈双方,建立采用基于不完美信息条件下的博弈模型，政府首先制定税收政策，产生污染的企业根据政府的政策制定对其有利的价格策略，求出双方的均衡解，得出影响均衡解的税率和企业产品的价格水平，政府可通过分析影响企业行为的均衡因素提高制定合理税率的决策水平. |
| 中文关键词:绿色物流 税收策略 反应函数 价格策略 环境污染 |
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| Green logistics tax strategy based on game theory model |
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| Abstract:In order to determine the additional tax ratio for the enterprises which emit the pollution in logistics activities, the government department which is responsible for formulating the tax policy and the enterprises which emit pollution in logistics activities are selected as two roles, and an imperfect information model is established based on the game theory. Government conducts a tax policy and the enterprises accord to government’s tax policy to develop their advantage price strategies. The two parts find a balanced solution under this game model. The product price level and tax rate which are two major factors affecting the equilibrium solution are obtained. Government can raise the decision level in formulating tax rates through analyzing the equilibrium factors which can influence the behavior of enterprises.
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| keywords:green logistics tax policy response function price strategy environmental pollution |
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