| 水铁联运专线建设投资演化博弈分析 |
| 投稿时间：2021-03-25 修订日期：2021-06-30 点此下载全文 |
| 引用本文：盛进路,李小凤,于敏,龚毅,杨忠振.水铁联运专线建设投资演化博弈分析[J].上海海事大学学报,2021,42(3):41-46. |
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| 基金项目:铁路与海运协同的外贸集装箱运输系统优化研究（72072097） |
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| 中文摘要:针对谁来主导投资建设水铁联运专线问题，通过分析其中涉及的主要利益者之间的利益关系，建立三方演化博弈模型。通过演化博弈理论并结合MATLAB仿真，揭示在有限理性条件下，博弈各方进行决策的行为特征及其稳定状态。结果表明：在投资收益大于原有收益情形下，政府和港口部门将选择独立投资或合作投资建设水铁联运专线，铁路部门将选择合作投资建设水铁联运专线。 |
| 中文关键词:综合交通运输 交通运输经济 投资策略 水铁联运 演化博弈 |
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| Analysis on investment evolutionary game of water rail combined transport dedicated line construction |
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| Abstract: Aiming at the question of who will lead the investment in the construction of the water rail combined transport dedicated line, a tripartite evolutionary game model is established by analyzing the interest relationships among the main stakeholders involved. Through the evolutionary game theory combined with MATLAB simulation, it reveals the behavioral characteristics and stable states of decision making of all parties in the game under bounded rationality conditions. The results show that: when the investment profit is greater than the original profit, the government and the port department will choose to invest independently or cooperatively in the construction of the water rail combined transport dedicated line, and the railway department will choose to invest cooperatively in the construction of the water rail combined transport dedicated line. |
| keywords:integrated transportation transportation economy investment strategy water rail combined transport evolutionary game |
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